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abstraCt
The main subject of  this paper is to investigate in Latin American inter-
national law the existence of  a more comprehensive list of  jus cogens rules, 
to the detriment of  the one existing in general/Europeanized international 
law. To do so, through a descriptive and exploratory bibliographical and ju-
risprudential research, the concept of  jus cogens in the field of  international 
law will be investigated in the light of  the knowledge forged in the inter-
-American human rights system, beyond those places considered as tradi-
tional, precisely because they are exclusive and dominating. The conclusion 
reached is that, based on libertarian theses, especially in the area of   human 
rights, it is possible to note the important role of  the inter-American plan by 
offering a counter-hegemonic voice with regard to the understanding of  the 
concept of  jus cogens on the basis in its decisions, proving to be a possibility 
of  resistance of  the South in the present time, in search of  its space in the 
construction of  the international right, from its own knowledge.
Key-words: Jus cogens. Inter-American System of  Human Rights.  Colo-
niality. North-South. Emancipation.
resumo
O objetivo central do presente trabalho é averiguar no âmbito do direito 
internacional latinoamericano a existência de um rol mais abrangente de 
regras de jus cogens, em detrimento daquele existente no direito internacional 
geral/europeizado. Para tanto, por intermédio de uma pesquisa bibliográfica 
e jurisprudencial, de cunho descritivo e exploratório, averiguar- se- á o con-
ceito de jus cogens no plano do direito internacional à luz do conhecimento 
forjado no Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos, para além daque-
las localidades tidas como tradicionais, justamente por serem excludentes e 
dominadoras. A conclusão que se chega é que, a partir das teses libertárias, 
especialmente na seara dos direitos humanos, é possível notar o importante 
papel do plano interamericano ao oferecer uma voz contra- hegemônica no 
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que tange o entendimento do conceito de jus cogens com 
base em suas decisões, demonstrando ser uma possi-
bilidade de resistência do Sul na atualidade, em busca 
do seu espaço na construção do direito internacional, a 
partir do seu próprio conhecimento.
Palavras-chave: Jus cogens. Sistema Interamericano de 
Direitos Humanos. Colonialidade. Norte/Sul.
1. introduCtion
International law is a field of  law which, although 
comprises the various States that compose the inter-
national society, is also extremely excluding regarding 
the (re)production of  its norms, rarely allowing subjects 
outside the European/Western/North axis to deter-
mine or to corroborate to the regeneration of  its laws, 
always seeking – even remotely – in its “Westphalian 
origins” the answers for its problems. It means that in-
ternational law is clearly regulated by oligarchical forces 
that dominate the power and, consequently, the know-
ledge of  this plan, consubstantiating itself  in a domi-
nant and excluding sphere, which usually rejects the 
contributions made by those that are not in the central 
axis of  the international system.
This situation reflects directly in the ascertainment 
of  the sources of  international law, whose purpose is 
to forge the basis for the maintenance of  social order 
in international relations, adjusting the conducts of  the 
numerous parts that compose it. After all, in the ab-
sence of  a harmonious and open participation among 
the various subjects, the determination of  the actions 
accepted (or not) in social life will be unilaterally con-
ceived and may lead to the suppression of  regionally 
common practices. In this sense, the attribution of  the 
cogent character to certain rules is an example, espe-
cially when they are accepted and recognized only by 
part of  the international community of  States, disre-
garding developments of  other places that are equally 
relevant, which could be equally recognized as cogent 
norms.
Therefore, throughout a descriptive-exploratory bi-
bliographical and jurisprudential research, the concept 
of  jus cogens in international law will be investigated in 
light of  the knowledge forged in various places, es-
pecially regarding the decisions of  the Interamerican 
System of  Human Rights. After all, the main objecti-
ve of  the present study is to investigate the existence 
of  a broader range of  jus cogens rules within the Latin-
-American international law, instead of  those existing 
in the general/European international law, in order to 
demonstrate the role that the Global South presents to 
the consolidation of  the obligations that contribute to 
the improvement of  human rights, denoting the impor-
tance of  a ‘libertarian view’ of  that concept, which is 
echoed in the anti-hegemonic discourses that the deco-
lonial thought presents.  
2. Jus Cogens: a europeanized ConCept
The imperative rules of  international law, usually 
referred to as jus cogens norms or peremptory norms, 
are inalienable legal precepts, and therefore cannot be 
suspended at any time, not even in extreme situations. 
They are understood as directives deriving from Natu-
ral Law,1 and therefore they would form the fundamen-
tal basis of  the normative system of  the international 
level.2 After all, jus cogens standards are set aside to the 
right that States have in determining their own norms 
and conducts,3 being typically of  ordre publique.4 In other 
1  The origins of  the jus cogens rules can be found in classic 
works of  International Law dating from the eighteenth century, 
as in Christian Wolf  and Emmerich de Vattel, suggesting that they 
would be derived from Natural Law. CZAPLINSKI, Wladyslaw. 
Jus cogens and the law of  treaties. In: TOMUSCHAT, Christian; 
THOUVENIN, Jean-Marc (Ed.). The fundamental rules of  the 
international legal order: jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 2006. p. 83. However, as An-
dré Gonçalves Pereira and Fausto de Quadros point out, those rules 
would have been cited by Hugo Grotius in his 1625 book “War and 
Peace Law”, while a ‘jus strictum’ derived from ‘God’ as a specific cat-
egory of  rules of  the ‘right of  the peoples’ (PEREIRA, André G.; 
QUADROS, Fausto de. Manual de direito internacional público. 
3. ed. Coimbra: Almedina, 2009. p. 278). Still, according to Paulo 
Borba Casella, the origin of  the peremptory rules would go back 
to the writings of  Francisco de Vitória, who, inspired by Roman 
law, gave the idea that people would be obliged to obey the rules 
common to the globe (ACCIOLY, Hidelbrando; SILVA, Geraldo 
Eulálio N.; CASELLA, Paulo B. Manual de direito internacional 
público. 15. ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008, p. 109). 
2   BROWNLIE, Ian. Public international law. 6.. ed. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 488; JANIS, Mark W. An intro-
duction to international law. 4. ed. New York: Aspen Publishers, 
2003. p. 65.
3  RAGAZZI, Maurizio. The concept of  international obliga-
tions erga omnes. New York: Oxford Monographs in Internation-
al Law, 1997. p. 57.
4   Justifying that sovereignty is not inalienable, based on The S.S. 
Wimblendom case of  the Permanent Court of  International Justice, 
judged in 1923. BASINOUNI, M. Cherif. Crimes against human-
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words, jus cogens rules are norms that impose a restric-
tion on the sovereignty of  nations while carrying out 
their activities, imposing a limit to states’ voluntarism, 
whether in the internal or external sphere.
This way, jus cogens can be understood as being basic 
norms of  a natural order formed by common interests, 
which have an objective character, being imposed by 
the international order to its participants, independently 
of  their will.5 And precisely because they have this im-
posing characteristic, some judges of  the International 
Court of  Justice characterize them as being higher law, 
that is, rules that are beyond the reach of  States, which 
would always have priority in their application when in 
contrast to any other normative sources of  (Internatio-
nal) Law,6 being them either lex specialis or lex generalis.7
As far as it is known, these rules were used for the 
first time in the nineteenth century as a possible way of  
invalidating international agreements contrary to them, 
despite the impossibility of  identifying such pre-exis-
ting “standardized” precepts at the time.8 However, the-
re was an attempt to set a common ground about what 
the rules of  jus cogens would become in the twentieth 
century, since the Cold War environment became so-
mewhat less fierce not only because of  the implemen-
tation of  a newer political strategy known as Détente 
by the Americans, but also because of  the progress of  
ity in international criminal law. 2. ed. Hague: Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 1999. p. 213. 
   Referring to the Serbian and Brazilian Loans case of  1929, in 
which the Permanent Court of  International Justice used the con-
cept of  jus cogens as ‘a rule recognized in most legal systems and 
identified as being of  public order’. CZAPLINSKI, Wladyslaw. 
Jus cogens and the law of  treaties. In: TOMUSCHAT, Christian; 
THOUVENIN, Jean-Marc (Ed.). The fundamental rules of  the 
international legal order: jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 2006. p. 84.
5   TOMUSCHAT, Christian. Obligations arising for States with-
out or against their will. Recueil des cours de l’academie de droit 
international de la Haye, v. 241, p.195-374, 1993. p. 227. 
6   INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Case concern-
ing the right of  passage over indian territory. Merits - Dissent-
ing Opinion Judge Fernandes. 1960. p. 135; INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE. Legal consequences for States of  the 
continues presence of  South Africa in Namibia. Advisory 
Opinion – Separate opinion Judge Ammoun. 1971. p. 66.  
7  AKENHURST, Michael. Custom as a source of  international 
law. British yearbook of  international law. v. 41, n. 1, p. 1-53, 
1974.
8   CZAPLINSKI, Wladyslaw. Jus Cogens and the Law of  Trea-
ties. In: TOMUSCHAT, Christian; THOUVENIN, Jean-Marc (Ed.). 
The fundamental rules of  the international legal order: jus co-
gens and obligations erga omnes. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  Publish-
ers, 2006. p. 83.
the discussions towards the negotiation of  a new con-
vention contemplating rules concerning international 
treaties.
Drawing on a proposal from the socialist countries, 
on that occasion “jus cogens was seen as a political op-
portunity to crystallize once and for all the ‘rules of  
the game’ concerning peaceful coexistence between 
East and West.”9 Despite having received some support 
from Latin American and Afro-Asian countries,10 many 
Western countries remained reluctant to do so, given 
that it would limit their actions - their ‘willingness’11 - at 
the international level. Only a concept was achieved,12 
thus highlighting the role of  the International Court 
of  Justice in “endorsing” the attribution of  such a cha-
racteristic to a particular rule,13 which undeniably “left 
all States absolutely free to argue for or against the jus 
cogens character under any circumstances at the inter-
national level.”14
Consequently, jus cogens rules are, thus, defined in 
Article 53 of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  
Treaties:
A treaty is void if, at the time of  its conclusion, 
it conflicts with a peremptory norm of  general 
international law. For the purposes of  the present 
Convention, a peremptory norm of  general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of  States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent 
norm of  general international law having the same 
character (emphasis added).15
9  CASSESE, Antônio. International law. 2. ed. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2005. p. 200.
10  The support of  the countries of  the global South was limited 
since they imposed a condition for accepting such a proposal, that is, 
“that some mechanism for the judicial determination of  a peremp-
tory rule be built”. CASSESE, Antônio. International law. 2. ed. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 200.
11  For a debate on voluntarism, cf.: SQUEFF, Tatiana de Almeida 
Freitas Rodrigues Cardoso. As relações entre o direito internacional 
e o Estado soberano na visão de Georg Jellinek. Revista campo 
jurídico, Barreiras, v. 4, p. 136-151, 2016.
12  CASSESE, Antônio. International law. 2. ed. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2005. p. 200.
13  VERHOEVEN, Joe. Jus cogens and reservations or ‘coun-
ter-reservations’: to the jurisdiction of  the International Court of  
Justice. In: WELLENS, Karel (Ed.) International law: theory and 
practice. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 1998, p. 197.
14  SCHWARZENBERGER, Georg. The problem of  interna-
tional public policy. Current legal problems, London, v. 18, n. 1, p. 
191-214, 1965, p. 213.
15  (cf. also Article 64 of  the same document). UNITED NA-
TIONS. Vienna convention on the law of  treaties: Vienna, 23 
May 1969. Treaty series, v. 1155, p. 331 Available at: <https://
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From the reading of  this definition established in 
1969 (and in force in the international level since the 
middle of  the 1980s)16, it is understood that this is a 
rule that should be accepted by the totality of  the participants 
of  the international order, anticipating the need for this to 
be a rule of  universal interest. This rule would allow no 
derogation, even in times of  crisis, and could only be 
modified when replaced by a supervening general rule 
of  international law that addresses the same matter and 
that has at least the same protective value.17
Nevertheless, in view of  the discussions at the Ple-
nipotentiary Conference, it was already noticeable that, 
after all, it would not be possible to list such rules and, 
much worse, that it would be very unlikely to reach a 
consensus on what would be a ‘universal interest’, parti-
cularly considering the moment interstate relations were 
at that time, and due to the very position of  Western 
countries (nowadays, of  the global North), especially 
for their “tradition” regarding the formation of  the in-
ternational legal order and their constant struggle for 
gaining (more) power in international relations18.19  
Even because, it was not for any reason other than 
by their position that the negotiations have not advan-
ced in order to set and insert in the Vienna Convention 
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en>.
16  UNITED NATIONS. Vienna convention on the law of  
treaties: Vienna, 23 May 1969. Treaty series, v. 1155, p. 331 
Available at: <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=m
tdsg3&lang=en>.
17  It is worth remembering that in rules containing jus cogens 
norms that were replaced by others afterwards, only the provisions 
concerning peremptory norms will be annulled. and not the treaty as 
a whole. DINH, Nguyen Quoc et al. Direito internacional públi-
co. Tradução Vítor Marques Coelho. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste 
Gulbenkian, 1999, p. 287-288; VIEGAS, Vera Lúcia. Jus cogens e o 
tema da nulidade dos tratados. Revista de informação legislativa. 
Brasília, ano. 36, n. 144, p. 181-196 out./dez. 1999.
18  On this, cf.: MORGENTHAU, Hans. Política entre as 
nações. Tradução Oswaldo Biato. São Paulo: UnB/IPRI, 2003. p. 
21, 51, 89-90, 98-99, 120.
19  Valério de Oliveira Mazzuoli, on the other hand, is optimistic 
about the results of  such a conference by saying that the recog-
nition of  the rules of  jus cogens “by the Vienna Convention of  
1969 represented another factor of  crisis of  voluntarism, as well 
as a strengthening of  the foundation of  Public International Law”. 
MAZZUOLI, Valerio de O. Direito dos tratados. São Paulo: RT, 
2011. p. 269. André de Carvalho Ramos follows up this position-
ing. For him, the Vienna Convention of  1969 “moved away from 
the voluntarist paradigm”. RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Art. 53. In: 
SALIBA, Aziz Tuffi (Coord.). Direito dos tratados: comentários à 
convenção de Viena do direito dos tratados (1969). Belo Horizonte: 
Arraes, 2011. p. 452.
on the Law of  Treaties a specific list of  rules considered 
as jus cogens at the time. And it follows from this the fact 
that imperative rules currently “are not a new formal 
category of  sources of  international law, but they [only] 
describe a particular quality that certain rules hold.”20 
The rules already considered jus cogens gain “only” a 
special adjective, which attributes to it peculiar charac-
teristics such as non-derogability, superiority (superior 
law) and permanence (they are only replaced by equal or 
more protective rules) - not being a normative source in 
itself. In fact, this is why Ricardo Monaco affirms that 
jus cogens norms do not have direct normative effective-
ness.21
According to Valério de Oliveira Mazzuoli,22 there 
would already be rules that have this characteristic. For 
the author, some of  them have customary origin, while 
others are conventional. Moreover, it is not possible to 
say that these would be the only two plausible sources 
of  the constitution of  peremptory norms. In addition 
to international courts pointing this characteristic to 
certain norms,23 as Salem Nasser points out,24 “in the 
work of  the International Law Commission and in the 
writings of  publicists it is possible to find examples of  
norms presented as jus cogens.” Among the most com-
monly cited rules, according to the author, there is:
[...] the pacta sunt servanda principle; prohibition 
of  the use or threat of  use of  force; the prohibition 
of  acts that violate the sovereignty and equality 
of  States; the principle of  self-determination of  
20  Referring to the position of  the International Court of  Justice 
in the Nuclear Weapons case, judged in 1996, when they read in 
paragraph 83 that “the question of  whether or not the jus cogens 
is related to a feature of  the norm”. PELLET, Alain. Article 38. In: 
ZIMMERMANN, Andreas et al. The statute of  the International 
Court of  Justice: a commentary. 2. ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. p. 846.
21  MONACO, Ricardo. Cours général de droit international pub-
lique. Recueil des cours de l’academie de droit international de 
la Haye, v. 125, n.3, p. 93-336, 1968. p. 209.
22  MAZZUOLI, Valerio de O. Direito dos tratados. São Paulo: 
RT, 2011. p. 268
23  reporting several judgments that attribute the peremptory char-
acteristic to rules of  international law. Cf. FRIEDERICH, Tatyana 
Sheila. As normas imperativas de direito internacional público: 
jus cogens. Curitiba: Forum, 2004, p. 121-146. 
For comments on cases that go back to the Permanent Court of  
International Justice. RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Art. 53. In: 
SALIBA, Aziz Tuffi (Coord.). Direito dos tratados: comentários à 
convenção de Viena do direito dos tratados (1969). Belo Horizonte: 
Arraes, 2011. p. 449-450, 463-465.  
24  NASSER, Salem Hikmat. Jus cogens: ainda esse desconhe-
cido. Revista direito GV, São Paulo, v. 1, n. 2, p. 161–178, jun./
dez. 2005. p. 165.
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peoples; the principle of  sovereignty over natural 
resources; prohibition of  trafficking in human 
beings; the prohibition of  piracy; the prohibition 
of  genocide; the prohibition of  acts classified as 
crimes against humanity and the principles of  
humanitarian law codified in the Four Geneva 
Conventions, fundamental principles of  human 
rights and the law of  the environment.25
In any case, with regard to the customary nature of  
jus cogens rules, it is important to emphasize first that 
while customary rules must obtain a minimum con-
sensus of  the States, being repeatedly practiced in the 
international level and presenting opino iuris regarding 
its obligatoriness; those rules should exceed such con-
sensus, reaching an absolute agreement among all the 
nations.26 Thus, jus cogens rules would be in the roots of  
the international consciousness, being considered an 
intrinsic, universally accepted value of  a certain rule.27
André de Carvalho Ramos disagrees with this posi-
tion.28 For him, unanimity among the States would not 
be necessary for the existence of  jus cogens rules, and “the 
new consensus necessary, then, for the consecration of  
an imperative norm, could be erected among the essen-
tial representatives of  the international community.” 
However, for the author, these essential representatives 
would be “those that comprise the countries represen-
tative of  the great economic, political and geographical 
currents of  the planet”, expressing that, in this way, no 
culture or current political system would be excluded.29
Similarly, as the author himself  points out, this 
would be a weak point of  this concept, since there is a 
tendency that the wills of  the strong and medium Sta-
tes overlap with the will of  the smaller States, thereby 
“denying the pluralism inherent in society of  States.”30 
25  NASSER, Salem Hikmat. Jus cogens: ainda esse desconhe-
cido. Revista direito GV, São Paulo, v. 1, n. 2, p. 161–178, jun./
dez. 2005, p. 165.
26  JANIS, Mark W. An introduction to international law. 4. ed. 
New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003. p. 66.
27  RAGAZZI, Maurizio. The concept of  international obli-
gations erga omnes. New York: Oxford Monographs in Interna-
tional Law, 1997. p. 54. 
28  RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Art. 53. In: SALIBA, Aziz Tuffi 
(Coord.). Direito dos tratados: comentários à convenção de Viena 
do direito dos tratados (1969). Belo Horizonte: Arraes, 2011. p. 454.
29  RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Art. 53. In: SALIBA, Aziz Tuffi 
(Coord.). Direito dos tratados: comentários à convenção de Viena 
do direito dos tratados (1969). Belo Horizonte: Arraes, 2011. p. 454.
30  RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Art. 53. In: SALIBA, Aziz Tuffi 
(Coord.). Direito dos tratados: comentários à convenção de Viena 
do direito dos tratados (1969). Belo Horizonte: Arraes, 2011. p. 445-
455.
Regardless of  whether the acceptance should be com-
prehensive (Janis) or be a majority (Ramos), it is thou-
ght that the need of  having a rule merely accepted by 
the international community as a whole goes back to 
the very “oligarchic” bases - to dialogue with Antônio 
Remiro-Brotons31 - of  International Law. This commu-
nity will exclude the countries that are not within what it 
is perceived as the traditional base of  its structure, even 
if  in the ideal plan it is desired to allow and to consider 
the speech of  all those that compose the international 
relations.
In any case and beyond consensus, it must be said 
that imperative norms could not be the object of  the 
persistent objector32, since, when determined as such, these 
norms would posses a general international precept of  
natural origin which would bind indistinctly all of  the 
world community, being it impossible to disassociate a 
State through “denial”.33 After all, peremptory norms 
would be universal, applicable to all, and would cons-
titute the foundation of  international public order in 
which the defense of  the general interest would overlap 
with a particular interest of  a particular country.34
Therefore, the rules which would already present the 
characteristic of  jus cogens by reason of  their originally 
customary nature would be:
[...] the prohibition of  the use of  force outside 
the framework of  self-defense; the norms on 
peaceful co-operation in the protection of  common 
interests, such as the freedom of  the seas, the rules 
31  REMIRO-BROTONS, Antônio. Derecho internacional 
público: principios fundamentales. Madrid: Tecnos, 1982, p. 66 
apud RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Art. 53. In: SALIBA, Aziz Tuffi 
(Coord.). Direito dos tratados: comentários à convenção de Viena 
do direito dos tratados (1969). Belo Horizonte: Arraes, 2011. p. 455
32  Persistent objector is the term used for the attitude of  a State 
to a customary norm of  international law. If  a State refrains from 
protesting against an agreement, it is implicitly understood that it 
agrees to such a rule. The opposite occurs when a state has the con-
sciousness of  refraining from or opposing the fulfillment of  a rule, 
proceeding in this way repeatedly. In this case, the rule would not 
apply to this State. SHAW, Malcolm N. International law. 4. ed. 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p 70-72.
33  RAGAZZI, Maurizio. The concept of  international obli-
gations erga omnes. New York: Oxford Monographs in Interna-
tional Law, 1997. p. 68-69; DANILENKO, Gennady. Law-making 
in the international community. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff  Pub-
lishers, 1993. p. 221-222; RAMOS, André de Carvalho. Art. 53. In: 
SALIBA, Aziz Tuffi (Coord.). Direito dos tratados: comentários à 
convenção de Viena do direito dos tratados (1969). Belo Horizonte: 
Arraes, 2011. p. 453
34  ACCIOLY, Hidelbrando; SILVA, Geraldo Eulálio N.; CASEL-
LA, Paulo B. Manual de direito internacional público. 15. ed. 
São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008. p. 22-23
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prohibiting slavery, piracy, genocide and racial 
discrimination; the protective rules of  religious 
freedom; the rules of  humanitarian law [...], as well 
as the norms prohibiting aggression; the norms 
protecting the rights of  States and peoples (such as 
those relating to equality, territorial integrity, self-
determination of  peoples).35
However, some treaties would also assign the “jus 
cogens attribute” to some of  their rules.36 The most 
accepted example beyond the principles cited in the 
Charter of  the United Nations37 is the International Co-
venant on Civil and Political Rights, which lists rules 
that could not be suspended in any event – the basic 
characteristic of  a peremptory rule.38 Article 4(2) of  the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)39 states that, even in extraordinary situations, 
certain rights can not be suspended. They are the right 
to life (Article 6), the prohibition of  torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Arti-
cle 7), the prohibition of  slavery or servitude (Article 
8 (1) and (2)), opposition to arrest for breach of  con-
tract (Article 11), the refusal to condemn someone for 
a crime not provided for by national or international 
order (Article 15), the right of  the individual to have 
recognized his or her legal personality (Article 16) and, 
finally, the right to freedom of  thought, conscience and 
religion (Article 18).40
35  MAZZUOLI, Valerio de O. Direito dos tratados. São Paulo: 
RT, 2011. p. 268.
36  Regarding this, in spite of  the use of  the terms “to assign” and 
“to recognize”, it is understood that the rules considered jus cogens 
already have this characteristic in themselves, given their origin in 
Natural Law. Therefore, it is important to say that treaties and juris-
prudence carry out “declaratory acts” and not “constitutive acts” by 
giving the imperative adjective to a given source of  international law.
37  In the UN charter are referred to as being jus cogens “the 
principles of  the peaceful settlement of  conflicts, the preservation 
of  international peace, security and justice”. MAZZUOLI, Valerio 
de O. Direito dos tratados. São Paulo: RT, 2011. p. 268.
38  It is important to note that even though they are provided 
for in treaties, the recognition of  these rules as jus cogens noorms 
theoretically would not be limited to the contracting parties, after all 
jus cogens are rules formed from the collective interest that come 
from the Natural Law, therefore being of  public order. MONACO, 
Ricardo. Cours général de droit international publique. Recueil des 
cours de l’Academie de Droit International de la Haye, v. 125, 
n.3, p. 93-336, 1968. p. 209; ACCIOLY, Hidelbrando; SILVA, Ger-
aldo Eulálio N.; CASELLA, Paulo B. Manual de direito internac-
ional público. 15. ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2008. p. 22-23).
39  UNITED NATIONS. International covenant on civil and 
political rights: adopted by the General Assembly of  the Unit-
ed Nations on 19 December 1966. v. 999, n. 14668. Available at: 
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/
volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf>. 
40  Despite the rights of  due process of  law (Article 14) and per-
It is interesting to note that there is little discussion 
in the literature about a similar rule existing in the regio-
nal protection domains,41 notably in the Inter-American 
System for the Protection of  Human Rights, which 
through Article 27(2) of  the American Convention of  
Human Rights  equally provides for rights unavailable 
to States,42 however, in a much broader role than that 
the one foreseen by the ICCPR. Those would be: Ar-
ticle 3 (right to recognition of  legal personality), article 
4 (right to life), article 5 (right to humane treatment), 
article 6 (prohibition of  slavery and servitude), article 9 
(principle of  legality and retroactivity), article 12 (free-
dom of  conscience and religion), article 17 (protection 
of  the family), article 18 (right to name), article 19 (ri-
ghts of  the child), article 20 (right to nationality) and 
article 23 (political rights). In this sense, the great ques-
tion that arises is whether these rules would also have a 
peremptory character, given the direct mention of  their 
unavailability, even in times of  exception.43
After all, as previously stated, the definition of  jus co-
gens contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of  
sonal liberty (Article 9) being defeasible in exceptional cases, the former 
United Nations Human Rights Committee has already made restric-
tions on the right to suspend such rules even if  in emergency situations, 
taking into account the existence of  other protections involved in those 
articles that are considered to be irrevocable. JINKS, op cit, p. 109-111.
41  The European plan for the protection of  human rights will not 
be addressed, which, however, provides in Article 15 (2) of  the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
a list of  rights unavailable to States. Nevertheless, it is noted that the 
European Court of  Human Rights is inconsistent with regard to the 
protection of  the rights there prescribed as truly superior and non-
derogable rules, based largely on the analysis of  the specific case and 
the thesis of  the margin of  appreciation of  the States. For a debate, 
cf.: SQUEFF, Tatiana de Almeida Freitas Rodrigues Cardoso. A vio-
lação de jus cogens pelo Estado em casos de terrorismo: uma análise 
do caso Jean Charles de Menezes. Revista de direitos humanos 
em perspectiva, Belo Horizonte, v. 2, p. 170-191, 2016.
42  Considering that States are limited to jus cogens rules when 
they have written obligations at the international level and cannot 
distance themselves from a rule with a peremptory characteristic by 
means of  opinio iuris or their practice, it can be said that States 
cannot unilaterally create laws in the domestic plane that exclude 
the applicability of  rights that contain this adjective. RAGAZZI, 
Maurizio. The concept of  international obligations erga omnes. 
New York: Oxford Monographs in International Law, 1997. p. 58-
59. Thus, imperative norms have the same essence in domestic law, 
that is, they are inviolable, superior and permanent. DANILENKO, 
Gennady. Law-making in the international community. Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 1993. p 223.
43  ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. Department 
of  International Law. Secretariat for Legal Affairs. American con-
vention on human rights “Pact of  San Jose, Costa Rica” (B-
32). Available at: < http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-32_Ameri-
can_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf>.
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Treaties of  1969 establishes that the rules, in order to be 
recognized, must be rules accepted and acknowledged 
by the international community of  States as a whole. 
Could it, therefore, be possible to extend the list of  jus 
cogens rules parting from a regional system? In addition, 
would it be admissible for these rules to originate from 
countries of  the global South?
According to what is addressed in national and fo-
reign doctrine, this is not a straightforward or outda-
ted question, but unfortunately open and present in 
international society, which does not present any con-
sistent study in which we can support ourselves. Such 
an understanding is aligned to the consideration made 
by the Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) that the colonial reality of  international law 
ends up forging its own foundations by marginalizing 
non-European knowledge44, as does the non-accep-
tance of  the concept of  jus cogens established locally/
elsewhere. 
Perhaps this is due to the fact that resistance to the 
traditional standards of  international law (which are im-
posed on the countries of  the South) is still incipient, 
or perhaps due to the very lack of  space that these Sta-
tes have in the framework of  international relations to-
day to expose their positions, due to the existence of  a 
true oligarchy in this field, as pointed out the formerly 
quoted Antonio Remiro-Brotons. At last, the discourse 
that surrounds the United Nations and elsewhere in this 
field is fundamentally Eurocentric (especially in the field 
of  Human Rights), focusing on the problems of  the 
North to the detriment of  the concerns of  less expres-
sive States, which are commonly set as “invisible spaces 
of  humanity” for this reason.45
However, if  the discussion about the jus cogens cha-
racterization of  a rule is practically non-existent in rela-
tion to its customary or conventional nature, it is essen-
tial to emphasize the role played by the Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights in this matter. After all, its 
precedents have distanced themselves from the “recti-
linear” standards of  the international (Europeanized) 
44  FRANCO, Fernanda Cristina de Oliveira. Oportunidades e 
desafios das TWAIL no contexto latino-americano a partir de per-
spectivas dos povos indígenas ao direito internacional. Revista de 
direito internacional, Brasília, v. 12, n. 2, 2015 p. 226-244.
45  BRAGATO, Fernanda Frizzo. Para além do discurso eurocên-
trico dos direitos humanos: contribuições da descolonialidade. Re-
vista novos estudos jurídicos, Itajaí, v. 19, n. 1, p. 201-230, jan./
abr. 2014. p. 215-220.
level, bringing new interpretations of  jus cogens rules in 
the field of  human rights. 
Such interpretations can even be considered a flag of  
the South, which began with the entry of  Third World 
countries in the international interest, and which may 
(continue) to provoke the rupture of  the balance of  the 
international order hitherto called equitable, given the 
discrepancy of  the conditions to act within internatio-
nal relations, requiring international law to adapt itself  
to fit this new reality, since its instruments are not seen 
as ideal to deal with all these new variables any more.46 
Such precedents, hence, are a way of  putting the Third 
World present in international law, by exposing other 
sets of  values that are equally relevant to the internatio-
nal community as a whole, and which have been con-
sidered as peremptory rules regionally47, even though 
they have not been defended as such in other circles.
3. the expansion of the Jus Cogens ConCept 
promoted by the inter-ameriCan Court of 
human rights.
The Inter-American Court of  Human Rights is the 
competent court, within the framework of  the Inter-
-American System for the Protection of  Human Ri-
ghts, to recognize any international responsibility of  the 
States Parties to the American Convention on Human 
Rights and to interpret this treaty48. It is the organ res-
ponsible for protecting human rights in America, who-
se institution and action take into account not only the 
geographical and social situations of  the South, but also 
the historical circumstances that built the States of  that 
region49. In this sense, according to Antônio Augusto 
Cançado Trindade, it is the Court that has contributed 
46  FRANCO, Fernanda Cristina de Oliveira. Oportunidades e 
desafios das TWAIL no contexto latino-americano a partir de per-
spectivas dos povos indígenas ao direito internacional. Revista de 
direito internacional, Brasília, v. 12, n. 2, p. 226-244, 2015.
47  For a discussion regarding the exectuion of  hte Inter-Ameri-
can Court sentences, see: RESENDE, Augusto. A executividade das 
sentenças da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos no Brasil. 
Revista de direito internacional, Brasília, v. 10, n. 2, p. 226-236, 
2013.
48  PASQUALUCCI, J. M. The practice and procedure of  the 
inter-american court of  human rights. 2. ed. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013. p. 07-09.
49  TRINDADE, Antônio Augusto Cançado. Tratado de direito 
internacional dos direitos humanos. Porto Alegre: S. A. Fabris 
Editor, 2003. v. 3. p.28
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most to the evolution of  the concept of  jus cogens50.
In the first instance, the Inter-American Court only 
reaffirms the Europeanized concept of  jus cogens, consi-
dering that it is a mandatory norm that prohibits physi-
cal, psychological and moral torture51. However, the first 
extension of  the concept occurs in the judgment of  the 
Case of  the Brothers Gómez Paquiyauri vs. Peru52¸ when the 
Court expressly acknowledges that the violation of  jus 
cogens is prohibited in any situation, whether in times 
of  peace, wartime or during the State of  Emergency or 
Suspension of  constitutional guarantees. Likewise, the 
understanding of  the content of  jus cogens is extended 
to include all conduct prohibited by Article 5(2) of  the 
American Convention, namely, cruel, inhuman and de-
grading treatment53.
From this extension, an adaptation of  the concept 
of  jus cogens to the particularities of  the inter-Ame-
rican system is initiated, contradicting a possible closed 
list of  such norms and opening the way for the founda-
tion of  new bases for international law, that meets the 
needs of  humanity54 and of  the particularities of  each 
region of  the world. It follows, therefore, from the pre-
mise that, even though these rules are considered basic 
norms, with characteristics that go back to the natural 
order, they are formed by common interests, which are 
not rectilinear in all localities, so that, at the end, it is 
the courts that determine whether the content of  a rule 
may have the characteristic of  a ‘cogent norm’.55 After 
50  TRINDADE, Antônio Augusto Cançado. El ejercicio de la 
función judicial internacional: memorias de la Corte Interamerica-
na de Derechos Humanos. 3. ed. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2013, p.75
51  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Caso Cantoral Benavides Vs. Perú. Fondo. Sentencia 
de 18 de agosto de 2000. Serie C, n. 69, Parágrafos 102 e 103.
52  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Caso de los Hermanos Gómez Paquiyauri Vs. Perú. 
Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 8 de julio de 2004. Serie 
C, n. 110, Parágrafos 111-112.
53  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Caso del Penal Miguel Castro Castro Vs. Perú. Fondo, 
Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2006. Serie 
C, n. 160 
54  TRINDADE, Antonio Augusto Cançado. El ejercicio de la 
función judicial internacional: memorias de la Corte Interameri-
cana de Derechos Humanos. 3. ed. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2013. 
p. 80.
55  It should be noted that the problem would not be the discre-
tionary power international adjudicators might have in determining/
declaring which rules have such cogent characteristic; after all, judg-
es from the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights are “locally” 
chosen, that is, from the countries that accepted the jurisdiction of  
the Court. However, judges from the International Court of  Justice 
all, these rules carry fundamental values of  the inter-
national community, and international tribunals would 
interpret such values in light of  the context of  States in 
a particular region.
Thus, in the examination of  Advisory Opinion56 No. 
18/03 (Legal status and rights of  undocumented mi-
grants), requested by the Mexico, the Inter-American 
Court examines for the first time the concept of  jus co-
gens. The Court, thus, acknowledges that, although the 
concept is linked to the law of  treaties – specifically the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties – its evo-
lution is not limited to the law of  treaties and its area 
has been extended, now encompassing all branches of  
international law57, such as international human rights 
law and matters relating to the international responsi-
bility of  States.
Once these parameters are established, the Court 
examines the obligation of  States to respect and gua-
(ICJ) are chosen among all 193 states that are part of  United Na-
tions, being rather difficult to evoke local values in a sentence (and 
not in a separate/dissenting opinion) without being contradicted. As 
an example of  such difficulty, it may be pointed the work of  Cança-
do Trindade at the ICJ, which, for instance, tried to establish a prec-
edent regarding the acts perpetrated by nazi forces during World 
War II (slavery and  deportation) as actions that, as being violations 
of  jus cogens of  a delicti imperri nature, should not be trumped by 
state immunity – what was not upheld in the main decision, but 
only in his dissenting opinion (see INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE. Case of  jurisdictional immunities of  the State: 
Germany v. Italy. Judgment of  Feb. 3, 2012. Merits – Dissenting 
Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade. 2012, part. V).  
56  Pursuant to Article 2 of  its Statute, the Court has a jurisdic-
tional and advisory function. Without prejudice to contentious juris-
diction, it exercises advisory jurisdiction which allows OAS Member 
States - or the bodies listed in Chapter X of  the Charter of  the Or-
ganization -, even if  they do not recognize the Court’s contentious 
jurisdiction, to consult it on the interpretation of  the Convention 
or other treaties relating to the protection of  human rights under 
Article 64 (1) of  the American Convention. The Consultative Opin-
ions, resulting from the exercise of  this competence, constitute an 
authorized interpretation of  the norms of  the Convention and the 
basis for future interpretations, not implying the necessary binding 
of  the States to them, since there is no obligation of  observance 
of  their content. (MEDINA QUIROGA, Cecilia. The american 
convention: life, personal integrity, personal liberty, due process 
and judicial recourse, Center for Human Rights, University of  Chile 
School of  Law, San José: Mundo Gráfico, 2003, p.04). This charac-
teristic does not, however, detract from the relevance of  advisory 
opinions, which have given uniformity and consistency to interpre-
tations of  the Convention and been a mechanism of  doctrinal and 
judicial influence on the part of  the Court.
57  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Condición jurídica y derechos de los migrantes in-
documentados. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03 de 17 de septiem-
bre de 2003. Serie A n.18, parágrafos 98-99. 
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rantee all the rights provided for in the American Con-
vention without discrimination (Article 1[1]) and the right to 
equality before the law (Article 24). These rights are defined 
as real obligations of  States to the international com-
munity as a whole, not only to the individuals under 
their jurisdiction58, being inseparable from human dig-
nity, not only permeating the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, but also all corpus juris of  guardianship 
of  the human person59, so that they must govern all the 
state performance60.
Thus, it is established that the principles of  equality 
before the law of  non-discrimination belong to the set 
of  norms jus cogens¸ which gives them imperative cha-
racter and entails erga omnes obligations of  protection 
that bind all the States and generate effects with respect 
to third parties, including between individuals due to its 
horizontal and vertical efficacy broadth61. In addition, 
these are principles that influence not only national and 
international public order, but also the legal system as 
a whole, making discriminations related to gender, race, 
color, language, religion or belief, political opinion and 
of  any other nature, nationality, ethnic or social origin, 
age, economic status, marital status, birth or any other 
58  MOECKLI, Daniel; SHAH, Sangeeta; SIVAKUMARAN, 
Sandesh (Org.). International human rights law. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2010. p. 194.
59  The rights to equality and non-discrimination are enshrined in 
the Charter of  the United Nations (Article 1 [3]); in the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights (Articles 1, 2. [1] and 7); in the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (articles 2, 3 and 
26); in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Articles 2. [2] and 3); in the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination (article 2); in the Vienna 
Declaration and Program of  Action (articles 19-24); in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (Articles 1 [1] and 4); in the 
Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, which also 
expressly refers to the prohibition of  discrimination on grounds of  
sexual orientation (Article 21); in the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (Articles 2 and 3); in the Arab Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam (Article 1). It is also contained in the OAS 
Charter (Article 3 [1]); in the American Declaration of  the Rights 
and Duties of  Man (Article 3); in the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights (Articles 1 [1] and 24); and its Additional Protocol on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of  San Salvador”) 
(Article 3).
60  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Condición jurídica y derechos de los migrantes in-
documentados. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03 de 17 de septiem-
bre de 2003. Serie A, n. 18, parágrafo 100.
61  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Condición jurídica y derechos de los migrantes in-
documentados. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03 de 17 de septiem-
bre de 2003. Serie A, n. 18, parágrafo 100.
human condition or characteristic impossible62.
In compliance with this jus cogens obligation, States 
must: (1) refrain from any actions that directly or in-
directly create situations of  de facto discrimination (which 
occurs when the State favors actions and practices that 
discriminate against a particular group of  persons) or 
de jure (which takes place when the state creates laws 
that discriminate a certain group of  persons), as well 
as (2) adopting positive measures that may modify his-
torical and social situations of  inequality between cer-
tain groups and individuals within their jurisdiction63. 
In other words, recognition of  the right to equality and 
non-discrimination as non-derogable implies a requi-
rement for States to eradicate discrimination by im-
plementing measures that legitimately promote equity 
among all citizens.
The concept of  jus cogens is again amplified in the 
judgment of  the Goiburú case and others vs. Paraguay, re-
lated to ‘Condor Operation’. While examining the cri-
me of  forced disappearance64, the Court confirmed 
that, in view of  the seriousness of  the crime and the 
nature of  the rights implied in the injury, the prohibition 
of  forced disappearance and the related duty to investigate and 
punish those responsible are jus cogens norms, since forced 
disappearance violates multiple rights of  non-derogable 
character and constitute a transgression of  the nature 
of  human rights, and the abandonment of  the essen-
tial principles underlying the inter-American system65 
(and the international system itself  after 194566). Such 
62  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Condición jurídica y derechos de los migrantes in-
documentados. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03 de 17 de septiem-
bre de 2003. Serie A, n. 18, parágrafo 101.
63  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Condición jurídica y derechos de los migrantes in-
documentados. Opinión Consultiva OC-18/03 de 17 de septiem-
bre de 2003. Serie A, n. 18, parágrafos 103-105.
64  Forced disappearance, according to Article II of  the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance of  Persons, “... pri-
vation of  liberty of  a person or persons, in any form, practiced by 
agents of  the State or by persons or groups of  persons acting with 
the consent, support or consent of  the State, followed by a lack of  
information or a refusal to acknowledge the privation of  liberty or 
to report on the person’s whereabouts, thus preventing the exercise 
of  legal remedies and procedural guarantees relevant.”
65  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Caso Goiburú y otros Vs. Paraguay. Fondo, Repara-
ciones y Costas. Sentencia de 22 de septiembre de 2006. Serie C, 
n. 153.
66  TRINDADE, Antonio Augusto Cançado. El derecho inter-
nacional de los derechos humanos en el siglo XXI. Santiago: 
Editorial Juridica de Chile, 2006, p. 41.
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an understanding takes into account the gravity and the 
continuing and/or permanent character67 of  forced di-
sappearance68, which is a mark of  the dictatorships that 
Latin American states subsisted in the 1970s and 1980s.
From this decision, it can be affirmed that not only 
the prohibition to disappearance constitutes rule of  jus 
cogens, but also the correlative duty to investigate this cri-
me. The obligation to investigate, in accordance with 
the jurisprudence of  the Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights, corresponds to the obligation of  means 
(and not of  result), which includes, among other thin-
gs, prosecution and punishment of  those responsible 
for human rights violations, especially in view of  the 
gravity of  the crime of  forced disappearance69. Howe-
ver, it is necessary to say that only in case of  forced 
disappearance the obligation to investigate (and due 
process) becomes jus cogens norm; in other cases of  vio-
lation of  human rights, the duty to investigate, for the 
Inter-American Court, is not jus cogens, but a “common” 
violation of  human rights.
Thus, it is possible to say that the expansion of  the 
material content of  jus cogens by the Inter-American 
Court points in the opposite direction to the static and 
Europeanized concept established by the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of  Treaties of  1969 and other in-
ternational tribunals that are not in the South global. 
Although this development is still embryonic, the text’s 
purpose is to demonstrate the consolidation of  interna-
tional obligations that contribute to the advancement 
of  human rights, since they are considered fundamental 
principles and values of  the international order, and not 
merely the inter-American order, as it may seem.
In this sense, recognizing the right to equality and 
non-discrimination as a jus cogens norm, as well as other 
advances, such as the abovementioned prohibition on 
disappearance and the related duty to investigate this 
crime, which emerge at the Inter-American level, is 
67  It is a continuing crime, since enforced disappearance is an 
offense that begins with the privation of  liberty of  the victim and 
with the subsequent lack of  information about their destination and 
remains until the whereabouts of  the missing person are known and 
determined with sure your identity.
68  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Caso Anzualdo Castro vs. Perú. Excepción Preliminar, 
Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 22 de septiembre de 
2009. Serie C, n. 202, parágrafo 59.
69  CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HU-
MANOS. Caso Gelman Vs. Uruguay. Fondo y Reparaciones. 
Sentencia de 24 de febrero de 2011. Serie C, n. 221.
central to the contemporary scene of  international law, 
which is evidently more heterogeneous (and is gradually 
becoming more concerned with the particularities of  
peripheral regions beyond the traditional central axis). 
At least that is what is absorbed in the attribution of  
jus cogens character to rules other than those traditionally 
recognized by “ordinary” international law from a non-
-Eurocentric tribunal.
In one word,  from these judgments, the (even tou-
gh incipient) change in international law patterns is de-
monstrated, evidencing that human rights, in fact, can 
be an area of  resistance within Law, against domination 
and oppression imposed by the North, initiated in 1492 
with the dis(cover)y (up) of  America70.
4. the anti-hegemoniC disCourse: 
fundamentals for a CritiCism of the Closed 
ConCept of Jus Cogens.
The supposed “discovery” of  America and its sub-
sequent colonization mark the beginning of  modernity, 
being the moment from which, for the first time, a me-
chanism of  intercommunication was established, that is, 
a common ground was established: colonialism and the 
“European rationality”71. From this process, a mecha-
nism of  domination was set in the political-economic 
level, from which the coloniality derived – a hierarchical 
pattern of  power and knowledge that maintains, in the 
ideological-discursive level and at the level of  intersub-
jective relations, a domination of  the peoples of  the 
South. 72 
Besides the “economic revolution” established by 
modernity (throughout a political-economic domain 
of  the peoples of  the Global South), this process was 
70  DOUZINAS, Costas. Human rights and empire. The Po-
litical philosophy of  cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Routledge, 2007, p. 
08; DUSSEL, Enrique. 1492. El encubrimiento del Outro. Hacia el 
origen de “mito de la mordernidad”. Colección Academia número 
uno. La Paz: Plural Editores, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de 
la Educación – UMSA, 1994. p. 13-22
71  DUSSEL, Enrique. 1492 el encubrimiento del outro: hacia 
el origen de “mito de la mordernidad”. Colección Academia número 
uno. La Paz: Plural Editores, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de 
la Educación – UMSA, 1994. p. 13-22
72  QUIJANO, Aníbal. Colonialidade do poder, eurocentrismo e 
América Latina. In: LANDER, Edgardo (Org.). A colonialidade 
do saber: eurocentrismo e ciências sociais. Buenos Aires,: Consejo 
Latinoamericano de Ciências Sociales – CLACSO, 2005. p. 117-142.
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accompanied by a “epistemological revolution” that, 
although introduced in the and by Europe, influences 
the whole world, once it becomes the subsidy for the 
legitimation of  the classification and subjugation of  the 
“non-European”.73 From coloniality on, the “cover-up 
of  the other”74 begins, it means, the suppression and 
domination of  cultures and knowledge of  the non-Eu-
ropean peoples75. On one hand, modernity established 
parameters to determine who is the individual, who is 
the subject of  rights; on the other hand, in the epis-
temological level, it consolidated the overpowering of  
European discourse as universal.76
In this context, the expression “coloniality of  power” 
stands out to explain the continual domination existent 
from the North in relation to the South. According to 
this view, even if  the end of  the colonial administra-
tion itself  (the colonialism) has already happened, the 
matrix built in 1492 is still present in the today’s socie-
ty, so that the exploration and domination of  the other 
throughout the capitalist system and the international 
division of  labor still subsist.77 However, besides the 
structure strictly related to the abuse of  power throu-
gh the economic domination, this coloniality translates 
itself, in fact, in a complex structure, which encompas-
ses various levels of  oppression carried out today by 
Europeans and north-Americans78, among which is the 
73  MIGNOLO, Walter D. La opción descolonial.  Revista letral: 
Editorial Universidad de Granada. Granada, n. 01, p. 03-22, 2008. p. 07.
74  DUSSEL, Enrique. 1492 el encubrimiento del outro: hacia 
el origen de “mito de la mordernidad”. Colección Academia número 
uno. La Paz: Plural Editores, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de 
la Educación – UMSA, 1994. p. 35.
75  Within coloniality, a civilization process begins, from which 
the European society, legitimized by discourses of  evangelization, 
civilization, modernization, development, globalization, established 
itself  as a symbolic center of  what came to be known as the mod-
ern-colonial world system. LANDER, Edgardo. Ciencias sociales: 
saberes coloniales y eurocéntrico. In: LANDER, Edgardo (Org.). A 
colonialidade do saber: eurocentrismo e ciências sociais. Buenos 
Aires: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciências Sociales – CLACSO, 
2005. p. 04-23. p 11.)
76  QUIJANO, Aníbal. Colonialidad y modernidad/racionali-
dad. In: BONILLA, Heraclio (Org.). Los conquistados: 1492 y la 
población indígena de las Américas. Ecuador: Libri Mundi, Tercer 
Mundo Editores, 1992. p. 437-448.
77  QUIJANO, Aníbal. Colonialidad y modernidad/racionali-
dad. In: BONILLA, Heraclio (Org.). Los conquistados: 1492 y 
la población indígena de las Américas. Ecuador: Libri Mundi, Ter-
cer Mundo Editores, 1992. p. 437-448. p. 448; QUIJANO, Aníbal. 
Colonialidade do poder, eurocentrismo e América Latina. In: 
LANDER, Edgardo (Org.). A colonialidade do saber: eurocentris-
mo e ciências sociais. Buenos Aires,: Consejo Latinoamericano de 
Ciências Sociales – CLACSO, 2005. p. 117-118. 
78  MIGNOLO, Walter. Desobediencia epistémica: retórica de 
coloniality of  knowledge. 
This way of  coloniality refers to the epistemological 
legacy of  the Europeans in the South peoples, so that 
they would not be “authorized” to think and create their 
own knowledge, but only to reproduce the Eurocen-
tric epistemology, becoming a real impediment to the 
comprehension “[of] the world from the own world”.79 
It means that since that coloniality dimension, the epis-
temological diversity would be inexistent, as would any 
other experience that escaped the European standard, 
since only “one way of  producing knowledge” would 
exist, which must be globally repeated.80 
In this sense, coloniality propitiates the division, 
through an abysm, of  the world between metaphoric 
North and South, in which the first represents the epis-
temological dominant, rational paradigm, whose know-
ledge is the only valid, scientific and useful; the second 
would be that underdeveloped one, primitive, savage, 
whose subaltern knowledge is not scientific and that, 
therefore, is relegated to the academic and political mar-
ginality.81 It is from this abyssal division that the forms 
of  knowledge developed from Europe have become 
the only valid, objective and universal forms of  know-
ledge; in universal categories of  analysis applicable to 
any reality; in “normative propositions that define the 
duty to be for all the peoples of  the planet”. 82
This way, this reductionism allows that, in the case 
of  human rights, although their emancipatory poten-
tial, they may have their language manipulated by the 
hegemonic powers, being necessary to be aware of  the 
oppressive potential of  its universality.83 This because 
la modernidad, lógica de la colonialidad y gramática de la descoloni-
alidad. Argentina: Ediciones del signo, 2010, p. 12.
79  PORTO-GONÇALVES, Carlos Walter. In: LANDER, Ed-
gardo (Org.). Colonialidade do saber: eurocentrismo e ciências 
sociais: Perspectivas Latino-americanas. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 
2005, p. 3.
80  QUIJANO, Aníbal. Colonialidad y modernidad/racionali-
dad. In: BONILLA, Heraclio (Org.). Los conquistados: 1492 y la 
población indígena de las Américas. Ecuador: Libri Mundi, Tercer 
Mundo Editores, 1992. p. 446.
81  SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa. Para além do pensamento 
abissal: das linhas globais a uma ecologia de saberes. Revista crítica 
de ciências sociais, n. 78, p. 03-46, out. 2007,.
82  LANDER, Edgardo. Ciencias sociales: saberes coloniales y 
eurocéntrico. In: LANDER, Edgardo (Org.). A colonialidade do 
saber: eurocentrismo e ciências sociais. Buenos Aires: Consejo Lati-
noamericano de Ciências Sociales – CLACSO, 2005. p. 10.
83  GALINDO, George Rodrigo Bandeira. A volta do terceiro 
mundo ao direito internacional. Boletim da sociedade brasileira 
de direito internacional, v. 1. n. 119-124. ago./dez. 2013. p. 67-96.
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that conception turns impossible a foundation of  rights 
other than that one of  the Eurocentric paradigm84. It is 
precisely this the case of  the traditional concept of  jus 
cogens, that, as the dominant theory of  human rights, 
it also has a well-known Eurocentric historical-geogra-
phical and anthropological-philosophical foundation. 
5. final Considerations
The present text had as its main objective to expose 
the jus cogens as a concept originated from the Nor-
th, once not only its definition has been largely forged 
because of  the yearnings of  the nations that compose 
such global axis, but also by the very systematics of  the 
international plan be directed to the maintenance of  
the status quo regarding the production of  norms that 
compose the legal system, excluding the possibility of  
other regions, especially those ones that do not partici-
pate of  the oligarchy of  the system, to agree and con-
tribute for the recognition of  the peremptory character 
of  a certain rule. It was therefore argued hereby that 
this would be a clear example of  the domination exerci-
sed by the North in relation to the Global South, which 
reproduces itself  by the epistemic closure imposed by 
the Europeans, which end up promoting a real silence 
of  the South, preventing it to be a (re) producer of  any 
knowledge – what includes the determination of  rules 
with cogent characteristics. 
 However, from the ‘libertarian thesis’, particularly 
in the area of  the human rights, it is possible to note 
the important role of  the Inter-American System of  
Human Rights, especially the Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights, by offering a counter-hegemonic voice 
as regards to the understanding of  the jus cogens concept 
from its decisions. After all, if  “the search for alterna-
tives to the profoundly excluding and unequal confor-
mation of  the modern world requires an effort of  de-
construction of  the universal and natural character of  
the capitalist- liberal [Eurocentric] society” as Edgardo 
Lander85 affirms, this effort has been done by the Inte-
84  ROSILLO MARTÍNEZ, Alejandro. Fundamentación de 
los derechos humanos desde América Latina. México: Editorial 
Itaca, 2013. p. 39-40.
85  LANDER, Edgardo. Ciencias sociales: saberes coloniales y 
eurocéntrico. In: LANDER, Edgardo (Org.). A colonialidade do 
saber: eurocentrismo e ciências sociais. Buenos Aires: Consejo Lati-
noamericano de Ciências Sociales – CLACSO, 2005. p. 23. 
ramerican Court, which has been obtaining certain suc-
cess as regards to the attribution of  the cogent charac-
ter to certain rules, which escape the pattern nowadays 
conjectured in the international level.
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